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A Game Problem for Heat Equation
Lijuan Wang∗, Donghui Yang† and Zhiyong Yu‡
Abstract
In this paper, we consider a two-person game problem governed by a linear
heat equation. The existence of Nash equilibrium for this problem is considered.
Moreover, the bang-bang property of Nash equilibrium is discussed.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we assume that Ω is a bounded domain in Rd, d ≥ 1, with a C2 boundary
∂Ω. Let T be a given positive constant, ω1 and ω2 be two open and nonempty subsets of
Ω with ω1 ∩ ω2 = ∅. Let χω1 and χω2 be two characteristic functions of the sets ω1 and
ω2, respectively. The controlled linear heat equation under consideration is as follows:{
∂ty −∆y + a(x, t)y = χω1u1 + χω2u2 in Ω× (0, T ),
y = 0 on ∂Ω × (0, T ),
y(0) = y0 in Ω,
(1.1)
where y0 ∈ L
2(Ω) and a ∈ L∞(Ω × (0, T )) are two given functions. For each ui ∈
L2(0, T ;L2(Ω))(i = 1, 2), (1.1) has a unique solution in C([0, T ];L2(Ω)), denoted by
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y(·; u1, u2). Throughout the paper, we will omit the variables x and t for functions of
(x, t) and the variable x for functions of x, if there is no risk of causing any confusion.
For each i = 1, 2, we define the following admissible set of controls:
Ui , {u ∈ L
∞(0, T ;L2(Ω)) : ‖u(t)‖L2(Ω) ≤Mi for a.e. t ∈ (0, T )},
where Mi is a positive constant. Meanwhile, we introduce the following two functionals:
For each i = 1, 2, the functional Ji : (L
2(0, T ;L2(Ω)))2 → [0,+∞) is defined by
Ji(u1, u2) , ‖y(T ; u1, u2)− yi‖L2(Ω), for all (u1, u2) ∈ (L
2(0, T ;L2(Ω)))2, (1.2)
where yi ∈ L
2(Ω) is given and y1 6= y2. The problem we consider in this paper is:
(P) Does there exist (u∗1, u
∗
2) ∈ U1 × U2 so that
J1(u
∗
1, u
∗
2) ≤ J1(u1, u
∗
2) for all u1 ∈ U1 (1.3)
and
J2(u
∗
1, u
∗
2) ≤ J2(u
∗
1, u2) for all u2 ∈ U2? (1.4)
We call the problem (P) as a two-person nonzero-sum game problem. If the answer to
the problem (P) is yes, we call (u∗1, u
∗
2) a Nash equilibrium (or an optimal strategy pair,
or an optimal control pair) of (P). We can understand the problem (P) in the following
manner: There are two players executing their strategies and hoping to achieve their goals
y1 and y2, respectively. If the first player chooses the strategy u
∗
1, then the second player
can execute the strategy u∗2 so that y(T ; u
∗
1, u
∗
2) is closer to y2; Conversely, if the second
player chooses the strategy u∗2, then the first player can execute the strategy u
∗
1 so that
y(T ; u∗1, u
∗
2) is closer to y1. Roughly speaking, if one player is deviating from (u
∗
1, u
∗
2), then
the cost functional of this player would get larger; and there is no information given if
both players are deviating from the Nash equilibrium (u∗1, u
∗
2).
The first main result of this paper is about the existence of a Nash equilibrium of the
problem (P).
Theorem 1.1. The problem (P) admits a Nash equilibrium, i.e., there exists a pair of
(u∗1, u
∗
2) ∈ U1 × U2 so that (1.3) and (1.4) hold.
Differential games were introduced originally by Isaacs (see [11] and [12]). Since then,
lots of researchers were attracted to establish and improve the related theory. Meanwhile,
the theory was applied to a large number of fields. For a comprehensive survey on the
differential game theory, we refer to [10], [6], [4], [8], [23] and the references therein. It is
worthy to mention that, in the vase literature on game theory, the Kakutani type fixed
point theorems were often used to obtain the existence of Nash equilibria (see, for in-
stance, [17]). However, to the best of our knowledge, it seems the first time to apply this
approach to the game problems for heat equation.
The second main result of this paper is concerned with the bang-bang property of the
Nash equilibria of the problem (P).
2
Theorem 1.2. Let (u∗1, u
∗
2) ∈ U1 × U2 be a Nash equilibrium of the problem (P). Then
‖u∗1(t)‖L2(Ω) =M1 for a.e. t ∈ (0, T )
or
‖u∗2(t)‖L2(Ω) =M2 for a.e. t ∈ (0, T ).
To the best of our knowledge, the studies on bang-bang property are mainly about
time optimal control problems. Bang-bang property is indeed a property of time opti-
mal controls. It is not only important from perspective of applications, but also very
interesting from perspective of mathematics. In some cases, from the bang-bang prop-
erty of time optimal controls, one can easily get the uniqueness of time optimal control
to this problem (see [9]). The bang-bang property may help us to do better numerical
analyses and algorithm on time optimal controls in some cases (see, for instance, [13],
[14] and [16]). One of the usual methods to derive the bang-bang property is the use
of the controllability from measurable sets in time (see, for instance, [22], [19], [18] and
[2]). Another usual method to derive the bang-bang property is the use of the Pontryagin
Maximum Principle, together with some unique continuation of the adjoint equation (see,
for instance, [5] and [15]).
In the next two sections of this paper, we will give the proofs of Theorem 1.1 and
Theorem 1.2, respectively.
2 Existence of Nash equilibrium
In this section, we will prove Theorem 1.1. Its proof needs the next Kakutani Fixed Point
Theorem quoted from [1].
Lemma 2.1. Let S be a nonempty, compact and convex subset of a locally convex Haus-
dorff space X. Let Φ : S 7→ 2S (where 2S denotes the set consisting of all subsets of S) be
a set-valued function satisfying:
(i) For each s ∈ S, Φ(s) is a nonempty and convex subset;
(ii) GraphΦ , {(s, z) : s ∈ S and z ∈ Φ(s)} is closed.
Then the set of fixed points of Φ is nonempty and compact, where s∗ ∈ S is called to be a
fixed point of Φ if s∗ ∈ Φ(s∗).
Proof of Theorem 1.1. We first introduce three set-valued functions Φ1 : U1 7→ 2
U2 ,Φ2 :
U2 7→ 2
U1 and Φ : U1 × U2 7→ 2
U1×U2 as follows:
Φ1u1 , {u2 ∈ U2 : J2(u1, u2) ≤ J2(u1, v2) for all v2 ∈ U2}, u1 ∈ U1, (2.1)
Φ2u2 , {u1 ∈ U1 : J1(u1, u2) ≤ J1(v1, u2) for all v1 ∈ U1}, u2 ∈ U2, (2.2)
3
and
Φ(u1, u2) , {(u˜1, u˜2) : u˜1 ∈ Φ2u2 and u˜2 ∈ Φ1u1}, (u1, u2) ∈ U1 × U2. (2.3)
Then we set
X , (L∞w (0, T ;L
2(Ω)))2 and S , U1 × U2.
It is clear that X is a locally convex Hausdorff space. The rest of the proof will be carried
out by the following four steps.
Step 1. We show that S is a nonempty, compact and convex subset of X .
This fact can be easily checked. We omit the proofs here.
Step 2. We prove that Φ(u1, u2) is nonempty for each (u1, u2) ∈ S.
We arbitrarily fix (u1, u2) ∈ S. According to (2.1)-(2.3), it suffices to show that Φ1u1
and Φ2u2 are nonempty. For this purpose, we introduce the following auxiliary optimal
control problem:
(Pau) inf
v2∈U2
J2(u1, v2).
Let
d , inf
v2∈U2
J2(u1, v2). (2.4)
It is obvious that d ≥ 0. Let {v2,n}n≥1 ⊆ U2 be a minimizing sequence so that
d = lim
n→∞
J2(u1, v2,n). (2.5)
On one hand, since ‖v2,n‖L∞(0,T ;L2(Ω)) ≤ M2, there exists a subsequence of {n}n≥1, still
denoted by itself, and v2,0 ∈ U2, so that
v2,n → v2,0 weakly star in L
∞(0, T ;L2(Ω)). (2.6)
On the other hand, we denote that zn(·) , y(·; u1, v2,n)− y(·; u1, v2,0). According to (1.1),
it is clear that{
∂tzn −∆zn + a(x, t)zn = χω2(v2,n − v2,0) in Ω× (0, T ),
zn = 0 on ∂Ω× (0, T ),
zn(0) = 0 in Ω.
(2.7)
By L2-theory for parabolic equation (see [7]), we obtain that
‖zn‖L2(0,T ;H2(Ω)∩H10 (Ω)) + ‖∂tzn‖L2(0,T ;L2(Ω)) ≤ C‖v2,n − v2,0‖L2(0,T ;L2(Ω)), (2.8)
where C > 0 is a constant independent of n. It follows from (2.6) and (2.8) that there
exists a subsequence of {n}n≥1, still denoted by itself, and z ∈ L
2(0, T ;H2(Ω)∩H10(Ω))∩
W 1,2(0, T ;L2(Ω)), so that
zn → z weakly in L
2(0, T ;H2(Ω) ∩H10 (Ω)) ∩W
1,2(0, T ;L2(Ω))
and strongly in C([0, T ];L2(Ω)).
(2.9)
4
Passing to the limit for n→∞ in (2.7), by (2.6) and (2.9), we obtain that z = 0. Hence,
y(T ; u1, v2,n)→ y(T ; u1, v2,0) strongly in L
2(Ω). (2.10)
It follows from (2.5), (1.2) and (2.10) that
d = J2(u1, v2,0). (2.11)
Noting that v2,0 ∈ U2, by (2.4), (2.11) and (2.1), we obtain that v2,0 ∈ Φ1u1. This implies
that Φ1u1 6= ∅. In the same way, we also have that Φ2u2 6= ∅.
Step 3. We show that Φ(u1, u2) is a convex subset of U1×U2 for each (u1, u2) ∈ U1×U2.
We arbitrarily fix (u1, u2) ∈ U1×U2. According to (2.1)-(2.3), it suffices to prove that
Φ1u1 is a convex subset of U2. The convexity of Φ2u2 can be similarly proved. For this
purpose, we arbitrarily fix u˜2, û2 ∈ Φ1u1. By (2.1), we get that
u˜2, û2 ∈ U2, (2.12)
J2(u1, u˜2) ≤ J2(u1, v2) and J2(u1, û2) ≤ J2(u1, v2) for each v2 ∈ U2. (2.13)
For any λ ∈ [0, 1], by (1.2) and (1.1), we have that
J2(u1, λu˜2 + (1− λ)û2) = ‖y(T ; u1, λu˜2 + (1− λ)û2)− y2‖L2(Ω)
= ‖λ[y(T ; u1, u˜2)− y2] + (1− λ)[y(T ; u1, û2)− y2]‖L2(Ω)
≤ λJ2(u1, u˜2) + (1− λ)J2(u1, û2).
This, along with (2.12) and (2.13), yields that
λu˜2 + (1− λ)û2 ∈ U2
and
J2(u1, λu˜2 + (1− λ)û2) ≤ J2(u1, v2) for each v2 ∈ U2,
which indicate that λu˜2+(1−λ)û2 ∈ Φ1u1 (see (2.1)). Hence, Φ1u1 is a convex subset of U2.
Step 4. We prove that GraphΦ is closed.
It suffices to show that if (un,1, un,2) ∈ U1×U2, u˜n,1 ∈ Φ2un,2, u˜n,2 ∈ Φ1un,1, (un,1, un,2)→
(u1, u2) in X and (u˜n,1, u˜n,2)→ (u˜1, u˜2) in X , then
(u1, u2) ∈ U1 × U2, u˜1 ∈ Φ2u2 and u˜2 ∈ Φ1u1. (2.14)
Indeed, on one hand, by (2.1) and (2.2), we can easily check that
(u1, u2) ∈ U1 × U2, u˜1 ∈ U1 and u˜2 ∈ U2. (2.15)
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On the other hand, according to u˜n,1 ∈ Φ2un,2, (2.2) and (1.2), it is obvious that
‖y(T ; u˜n,1, un,2)− y1‖L2(Ω) ≤ ‖y(T ; v1, un,2)− y1‖L2(Ω) for each v1 ∈ U1. (2.16)
Since (u˜n,1, un,2) → (u˜1, u2) weakly star in (L
∞(0, T ;L2(Ω)))2, by similar arguments as
those to get (2.10), there exists a subsequence of {n}n≥1, still denoted by itself, so that
(y(T ; u˜n,1, un,2), y(T ; v1, un,2))→ (y(T ; u˜1, u2), y(T ; v1, u2)) strongly in (L
2(Ω))2. (2.17)
Passing to the limit for n→∞ in (2.16), by (2.17), we get that
‖y(T ; u˜1, u2)− y1‖L2(Ω) ≤ ‖y(T ; v1, u2)− y1‖L2(Ω) for each v1 ∈ U1.
This, together with (1.2), (2.2) and the second conclusion in (2.15), implies that u˜1 ∈ Φ2u2.
Similarly, u˜2 ∈ Φ1u1. Hence, (2.14) follows.
Step 5. We finish the proof.
According to Steps 1-4 and Lemma 2.1, there exists a pair of (u∗1, u
∗
2) ∈ U1×U2 so that
(u∗1, u
∗
2) ∈ Φ(u
∗
1, u
∗
2), which, combined with (2.1)-(2.3), indicates that (u
∗
1, u
∗
2) is a Nash
equilibrium of the problem (P).
In summary, we end the proof of Theorem 1.1. 
3 Bang-bang property
Proof of Theorem 1.2. Let (u∗1, u
∗
2) ∈ U1×U2 be a Nash equilibrium of the problem (P), i.e.,
(1.3) and (1.4) hold. We arbitrarily fix u1 ∈ U1 and λ ∈ (0, 1). Set u1,λ , u
∗
1+λ(u1−u
∗
1).
It is obvious that u1,λ ∈ U1. Then by (1.3), we get that
J1(u
∗
1, u
∗
2) ≤ J1(u1,λ, u
∗
2),
i.e., ‖y(T ; u∗1, u
∗
2) − y1‖L2(Ω) ≤ ‖y(T ; u1,λ, u
∗
2) − y1‖L2(Ω) (see (1.2)). From the latter it
follows that
〈y(T ; u∗1, u
∗
2)− y1, z(T )〉L2(Ω) ≥ 0, (3.1)
where z ∈ C([0, T ];L2(Ω)) is the unique solution to the equation{
∂tz −∆z + a(x, t)z = χω1(u1 − u
∗
1) in Ω× (0, T ),
z = 0 on ∂Ω× (0, T ),
z(0) = 0 in Ω.
(3.2)
Let ϕ ∈ C([0, T ];L2(Ω)) be the unique solution to the equation{
∂tϕ+∆ϕ− a(x, t)ϕ = 0 in Ω× (0, T ),
ϕ = 0 on ∂Ω× (0, T ),
ϕ(T ) = y1 − y(T ; u
∗
1, u
∗
2) in Ω.
(3.3)
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Multiplying (3.2) by ϕ and integrating it over Ω×(0, T ), after some calculations, by (3.3),
we obtain that∫ T
0
〈χω1ϕ(t), u1(t)− u
∗
1(t)〉L2(Ω)dt = 〈z(T ), y1 − y(T ; u
∗
1, u
∗
2)〉L2(Ω).
This, along with (3.1), implies that∫ T
0
〈χω1ϕ(t), u1(t)− u
∗
1(t)〉L2(Ω)dt ≤ 0 for each u1 ∈ U1. (3.4)
Since L2(Ω) is separable, there exists a countable subset U0 = {vℓ}ℓ≥1 so that U0 is dense
in U = {u ∈ L2(Ω) : ‖u‖L2(Ω) ≤M1}. For each vℓ ∈ U0, we define the function
gℓ(t) , 〈χω1ϕ(t), vℓ − u
∗
1(t)〉L2(Ω), t ∈ (0, T ).
Then gℓ(·) ∈ L
1(0, T ). Thus, there exists a measurable set Eℓ ⊆ (0, T ) with |Eℓ| = T , so
that any point in Eℓ is a Lebesgue point of gℓ(·). Namely,
lim
δ→0+
1
δ
∫ t+δ
t−δ
|gℓ(s)− gℓ(t)|ds = 0 for each t ∈ Eℓ.
Now, for any t ∈ Eℓ and δ > 0, we define
uδ(s) ,
{
u∗1(s) if s ∈ (0, T ) \ (t− δ, t + δ),
vℓ if s ∈ (0, T ) ∩ (t− δ, t + δ).
Then, by (3.4), we get that∫
(0,T )∩(t−δ,t+δ)
〈χω1ϕ(s), vℓ − u
∗
1(s)〉L2(Ω)ds ≤ 0.
Dividing the above inequality by δ > 0 and then sending δ → 0, we obtain that gℓ(t) ≤ 0.
From this, we see that for all t ∈
⋂
ℓ≥1Eℓ and vℓ ∈ U0,
〈χω1ϕ(t), vℓ〉L2(Ω) ≤ 〈χω1ϕ(t), u
∗
1(t)〉L2(Ω). (3.5)
Since U0 is countable and dense in U, by (3.5), we have that |
⋂
ℓ≥1Eℓ| = T and that for
a.e. t ∈ (0, T ),
〈χω1ϕ(t), u〉L2(Ω) ≤ 〈χω1ϕ(t), u
∗
1(t)〉L2(Ω) for all u ∈ U.
From these we obtain that
max
‖u‖
L2(Ω)≤M1
〈χω1ϕ(t), u〉L2(Ω) = 〈χω1ϕ(t), u
∗
1(t)〉L2(Ω) for a.e. t ∈ (0, T ). (3.6)
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Similarly, we have that
max
‖u‖
L2(Ω)≤M2
〈χω2ψ(t), u〉L2(Ω) = 〈χω2ψ(t), u
∗
2(t)〉L2(Ω) for a.e. t ∈ (0, T ), (3.7)
where ψ ∈ C([0, T ];L2(Ω)) is the unique solution to the equation{
∂tψ +∆ψ − a(x, t)ψ = 0 in Ω× (0, T ),
ψ = 0 on ∂Ω × (0, T ),
ψ(T ) = y2 − y(T ; u
∗
1, u
∗
2) in Ω.
(3.8)
Noting that y1 6= y2, by (3.3), (3.8), the unique continuation estimate at one time (see
[20]), and the backward uniqueness of the linear heat equation (see [3]), we obtain that
χω1ϕ(t) 6= 0 a.e. t ∈ (0, T ) or χω2ψ(t) 6= 0 a.e. t ∈ (0, T ).
These, together with (3.6) and (3.7), imply that
u∗1(t) =M1
χω1ϕ(t)
‖χω1ϕ(t)‖L2(Ω)
a.e. t ∈ (0, T )
or
u∗2(t) =M2
χω2ψ(t)
‖χω2ψ(t)‖L2(Ω)
a.e. t ∈ (0, T ).
Hence,
‖u∗1(t)‖L2(Ω) =M1 a.e. t ∈ (0, T ) or ‖u
∗
2(t)‖L2(Ω) =M2 a.e. t ∈ (0, T ).
In summary, we finish the proof of Theorem 1.2. 
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